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Abstract  
The present article critically examines the transmission channels between the real ex-
change rate and output growth adduced by the so-called New-Structuralist doctrine. It is 
shown that the assumptions under which the mechanisms work are highly restrictive, 
and hence, are generally inadequate to explore the problem of economic development in 
Latin American peripheral countries. In view of this, the potential risks associated with 
a policy of devaluation are warned.     
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1. Introduction1 
In the last years, we have witnessed the emergence of a vast literature on development 
models for peripheral economies, known as «New-Structuralism»2 (henceforth, NS), 
                                                          
1 A preliminary version of this article was presented at the 2nd New Developmentalism’s Workshop, 
‘Theory and Policy for Developing Countries’, São Paulo, August 4-5, 2017 and at Research Seminar of 
the Institute of Economics – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IE-UFRJ), August 8, 2017. We would 
like to thank the participants of both events for their comments and suggestions. We would also like to 
thank Saverio Fratini and an anonymous referee for their constructive comments and suggestions. All the 
remaining errors are ours. 
2 The term «New-Structuralism» has been employed in the literature in a broader sense: it refers to the 
contributions of the Economic Commission for Latin American Countries (ECLAC) in different fields of 
economics, from the 1990 onwards (structural reforms, globalization, innovation, macroeconomic volatil-
ity, etc; for a revision of this literature, see Bielschowsky, 2009). Here however, we will only discuss 
those works that, following ECLAC’s tradition, explore the link between exchange rate policy and eco-
nomic growth. The main proponents of this view are Ros and Skott (1998), Frenkel and Ros (2006), Ro-
drik (2008), Razmi, Rapetti, and Skott (2012), Rapetti (2013, 2016), Neto and Lima (2017), Ros (2016), 
and Damill and Frenkel (2017). 
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which views the real exchange rate as the key variable to achieve sustained economic 
growth. To formalize this view, NS has recourse to a «dual economy» model, a notion 
firstly introduced by Lewis (1954), and identifies two strikingly different productive 
sectors within a peripheral economy: a sector of high productivity, able to compete in 
the international markets at current prices (sector T, or the «tradable sector») and a sec-
ond sector of low productivity, which is forced to sell its output in the domestic market 
(sector NT, or the «non-tradable» sector).3 The fact is that sector T, typically the indus-
try, is also envisaged as the most dynamic sector in terms of job creation, innovation 
and productivity growth. In the short run, a rise in the exchange rate would accelerate 
economic growth mainly through its expansionary effects on employment and exports 
of sector T. In the medium run, the increase in the relative profitability of the most dy-
namic sector would induce a rise of its share in output. Finally, in the long run, the 
higher average rate of profits would trigger a profit-led-growth path.4  
The objective of this article is to critically assess the transmission channels adduced 
by NS. To this end, in section II we present a model for a small peripheral economy 
opened to trade and capital flows that will allow us a) to examine the mechanisms en-
visaged by this literature to ascertain a relationship between distribution and growth and 
b) to characterize the pattern of specialization of the economy as a particular problem of 
choice of techniques. 
In regard to objective a), we will see in section III that NS presents three kinds of 
limitations. First, when the so-called «short-term» effects are addressed, a high real-
wage elasticity of labour demand is assumed without sufficient justification, coupled 
with a demand for exports that is able to absorb any excess of production over internal 
consumption. Second, we also find problems with the «medium» and «long-term» mech-
anisms. Here, not only is it assumed that investment demand is able to avoid any reali-
zation problem, but, more generally, the approach is incompatible with the uniformity 
of returns on capital in an economy that is fully opened to capital flows. Finally, we 
show that the results in terms of employment and production are indeterminate, since 
the possibility of wage inflation indirectly caused by devaluation (namely, through its 
effects on output and employment) may eventually revert the allegedly positive effects 
on growth. 
As regards objective b), the determination of the productive structure in terms of 
cost-minimizing technical choices will allow us to inspect, in section IV, the implica-
                                                          
3 The taxonomy «Tradable vs. Non-Tradable» is misleading, since it may give the wrong impression 
that a particular sector intrinsically belongs to one of these categories, when this classification actually 
depends on income distribution and technical coefficients. However, to keep the exposition as simple as 
possible, in the main text we will stick to the standard terminology.      
4 Actually, within this literature it is possible to identify a second position, known as 
«New-Developmentalism» (see Bresser; 2008; Oreiro et al. 2015), that inverts the productive structure of 
the economy: sector T produces and exports primary commodities and the industrial sector, potentially 
more dynamic, is unable to export its production. According to this view, the role of the exchange rate is 
to close the competitiveness gap of industry to boost an export-led growth path. We shall not discuss here 
the scopes and limits of this second position (we hope to do this in a future contribution).  
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tions of inverting the pattern of specialization assumed by NS. In particular, the poten-
tially drastic magnitude of devaluation necessary to boost the development of the indus-
trial sector may sharply increase the domestic price of those goods that are already trad-
able. If some of these goods are necessary consumption goods (e.g. corn), or inputs of 
these goods (e.g. oil), as is the case for some Latin American economies, this rise may 
trigger wage resistance and possibly eliminate the initial reduction of labour costs in 
foreign currency. Curiously enough, this kind of wage inflation, in this case directly 
caused by devaluation, has been ignored or neglected by New-Structuralist authors. Fi-
nally, we shall see in section V that the attempt to use the exchange rate as an instru-
ment to improve the international competitiveness of one particular sector may well 
have the undesired effect of damaging another industry that was already competitive. 
Section VI concludes.  
2. Analytical Framework5 
We follow New-Structuralist authors and conceive a small open economy with persis-
tent unemployment and two productive sectors: an industrial sector (I) and a primary 
sector (C) (or services). The sectors distinguish themselves by two main features: i) the 
productive methods employed and ii) the destination of production. 
Regarding the first aspect, NS scholars assume that commodity I is produced by la-
bour and an imported capital good, while C requires labour and a fixed factor, typically 
land. Commodity prices can be represented by the following equations: 
𝑝𝐶




𝑆 = (𝑤𝑙𝐼 + 𝑘𝐸𝑝𝐾
∗ )(1 + 𝑟) [2] 
where 𝑝𝐶
𝑠  and 𝑝𝐼
𝑆 stand respectively, for the supply prices of commodities C and I. These 
prices represent the minimum amount of money per unit of output that producers must 
receive to regularly (under «normal conditions») deliver each commodity on the market. 
Additionally, w stands for the nominal wage rate, r for the normal rate of profits, 𝑙𝐶 and 
𝑙𝐼 are the unitary labour requirements of sectors C and I, k is the unitary requirement of 
a capital good K, 𝑝𝐾
∗  is its exogenously given price and E is the nominal exchange rate.  
It is now convenient to introduce a second notion of price, which we shall denomi-
nate demand or selling price. It represents the maximum amount of money that consum-
ers are willing to pay for a commodity. Note that, since the domestic economy takes the 
international prices of C (𝑝𝐶
∗ ) and I (𝑝𝐼
∗) as given, once the level of the exchange rate is 
fixed, demand prices are univocally determined. Therefore, demand prices for commod-
ities C (𝑝𝐶
𝑑) and I (𝑝𝐼
𝑑) are, respectively:  
                                                          
5 This section heavily draws on Dvoskin and Feldman (2017a) and (2017b). 
6 Since land rent (both absolute and differential) will not play any role in the analysis, for simplicity we 














𝑑. If we take nominal 
wages as given:  
𝑤 = ?̅?.7 [5] 
There are two degrees of freedom left. Before we suggest how to eliminate them, let 
us consider the abovementioned feature ii), i.e. the destination of production. Note that 
it is not possible to ascertain which productive sector will be internationally competitive 
before the relationship between demand and supply prices of each commodity is estab-
lished. Hence, before income distribution is known. Therefore, the pattern of specializa-
tion of the economy will be regulated by the following conditions:  
𝑝ℎ
𝑑 ≤ 𝑝ℎ
𝑠  (ℎ = 𝐶, 𝐼) [6] 
Commodity h will be produced and (potentially) exported only if 𝑝ℎ
𝑑 = 𝑝ℎ
𝑠 . In con-
trast, when 𝑝ℎ
𝑑 < 𝑝ℎ
𝑠 , sector h will not be viable without protection because its normal 




-r relation that determines, for each level of the E/w ratio, the maximum rate of 
profits that is affordable by each sector under given technical conditions and interna-
tional prices. This is obtained by equalizing supply and demand prices for each com-







− 1 [7] 











− 1. [8] 
The left-hand side of Figure 1 represents the shape of these curves:  
Figure 1: 𝐸/𝑤 − 𝑟 curve 
 
                                                          
7 NS assumes that the level of money wages is the result of the negotiation between trade unions and 






















The curves can be used to determine the pattern of specialization of the economy. To 




 , with 𝑃 = 𝐸 ∑ 𝑐ℎ𝑝ℎ
∗
ℎ=𝐶,𝐼 . [9] 
Therefore, the real wage 𝜔 is univocally determined once the 𝐸/𝑤 ratio is known, 
and shows an inverse relationship with the latter. According to a well-known result of 
choice of techniques (see Kurz and Salvadori, 1995, ch. 5), all this means that the econ-
omy will fully specialize in the sector that, given the 𝐸/𝑤 ratio – which is none other 
than the inverse of the real wage, 𝜔 – (or alternatively, given 𝑟), can afford the highest 
rate of profits (can afford the lowest 𝐸/𝑤 and hence, the highest 𝜔).  
Then, for any level 𝐸/𝑤 < 𝐸 /𝑤 (𝐸/𝑤 > 𝐸 /𝑤) there will be full specialization in the 
production of I (C). In effect, if for instance: 𝐸/𝑤 = 𝐸 /𝑤(< 𝐸 /𝑤) , then 𝑟?̅? > 𝑟?̅? and 
there will be no incentive to invest in sector C. The opposite occurs when 𝐸/𝑤 > 𝐸 /𝑤. 
And only by a fluke 𝐸/𝑤 = 𝐸 /𝑤, which is the level that allows the coexistence of the 
two sectors in the economy. 
The outer envelope of the curve (black line on the right-hand side) illustrates the 
economically relevant pairs of 𝐸/𝑤 and 𝑟.8 In analytical terms, the 𝐸/𝑤-𝑟 relationship is 
given by:  
𝑟 = {
𝑟𝐼                  𝐸/𝑤 < 𝐸 /𝑤
𝑟       𝑖𝑓        𝐸/𝑤 = 𝐸 /𝑤
𝑟𝐶                 𝐸/𝑤 > 𝐸 /𝑤
 [10] 












− 1. [11] 
(we shall return to condition [11] in section IV).  
In sum, if 𝐸/𝑤 and hence 𝜔 are known, the rate of profits is residually determined. 
Alternatively, if 𝑟 is given, 𝜔 adjusts to give consistency to the price system. Finally, 
the level of the exogenous distributive variable determines a certain productive structure 
according to condition [10]. Therefore, the remaining two degrees of freedom of the 
price-system will be eliminated once a) the particular distributive closure and b) the 
specific pattern of specialization assumed by NS are considered. This will be discussed 
in the following section. 
3. The New-Structuralist Position 
New-Structuralist scholars assume that the nominal exchange rate is determined by the 
monetary authority: 
𝐸 = 𝐸  [12] 
                                                          
8 Note that, with more than two commodities, in general there will be no E/w ratio that will allow the 
coexistence of all sectors. On this point, see Steedman (1999, p. 272) and Baldone (2001).  
6 
 
Since the 𝐸/𝑤 ratio is given, the rate of profits emerges as a residual magnitude from 
[10]. The level of 𝑟 is in turn determined once the pattern of specialization assumed by 
NS is specified. In this respect, NS assumes that sector I is able to compete in the inter-
national markets at the given prices (sector I is the T sector); and sector C is a relatively 
backward sector, whose production is only sold in the domestic markets (sector C is the 
NT sector).9 In the light of our model, the implied pattern of specialization is such that 
𝐸/𝑤 = 𝐸 /𝑤(< 𝐸 /𝑤) in Figure 1. And hence, that the rate of profits is determined at the 
level 𝑟𝐼 in equation [10], that is:  










− 1. [10A] 
Note that, while in the absence of protection commodity C should not be domestically 
produced, NS assumes that this good is intrinsically non-tradable (it is not subject to 
international competition), and hence its demand price is univocally determined by its 
domestic supply price. This implies that condition [3] must be replaced by: 
𝑝𝐶
𝑑 = 𝑝𝐶
𝑠 . [3A] 





𝑑 , 𝑤, 𝑟, 𝐸}. 
3.1. Short-run mechanisms 
According to NS, the rise in E exerts an expansionary effect through three mechanisms, 
all induced by the subsequent fall in 𝜔. It is central to trigger the entire process that NS 
postulates a negative relationship between labour demand in sector I (𝐿𝐼) and 𝜔. Hence, 
the first effect of devaluation is the rise in 𝐿𝐼, which in turn causes an expansion of in-
dustrial output, 𝑦𝐼, represented by a «Cobb Douglas» production function 
𝑦𝐼 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿𝐼).
10 
↑ 𝐸/𝑤 → ↑ 𝑝𝐼 → ↓ 𝜔 → ↑  𝐿𝐼 →↑ 𝑦𝐼 [A] 
                                                          
9 Therefore, the small peripheral economy exports commodity 𝐼 in exchange for imports of the capital 
good, 𝐾. No particular result of the current account is assumed by NS scholars (see e.g. Neto and Lima, 
2017, pp. 795 and 798). If there is a current account surplus, the implicit assumption is that the country 
accumulates reserves of foreign assets. While in case of current account deficits, since the economy is 
small in financial terms, it is argued that it can finance this imbalance indefinitely through capital inflows 
(ibid., p. 795).      
10 The function 𝑓(∙) = 𝐴𝐾𝛾𝐾𝛼𝐿𝐼
1−𝛼  is assumed to present decreasing marginal returns and increasing 
returns to scale, which, to be compatible with free competition, are assumed to be external to the firm and 
internal to the industry (𝐾𝛾 measures the external effect). This is allegedly due to «externalities in the 
learning process» (Rapetti, 2013, p. 12). Note that these conditions are highly restrictive since “…the 
economies of production on a large scale can seldom be allocated exactly to any one industry: they are in 
great measure attached to groups, often large groups, of correlated industries” (Marshall, cited by Sraffa, 
1926, p. 540). It seems therefore arbitrary to assume that the externalities that affect sector I do not have 
an influence on sector C. The assumption is tantamount to assuming the total disconnection among pro-
ductive sectors, ignoring the possible input-output relations that generally emerge among them.  
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These expansionary effects are not restricted to sector I, but involve sector C too. First-
ly, because the expansion of 𝑦𝐼 increases aggregate income and, therefore, the demand 
for C (𝐷𝐶) («income effect»). 
↑ 𝐸/𝑤 →↓ 𝜔 →↑ 𝐿𝐼  → ↑ 𝑦𝐼 →↑ 𝐷𝐶 → ↑ 𝐿𝐶 →↑ yC [B] 
Second, because the rise in 𝑞 ≡
𝑝𝐼
𝑝𝐶
 increases the demand for –the now relatively cheap-
er– good C («substitution effect»). 
↑ 𝐸/𝑤 →↑ 𝑞 → ↑ 𝐷𝐶 → ↑ 𝐿𝐶 → ↑ 𝑦𝐶 [C] 
To ascertain the validity of these three mechanisms it is necessary to make two kinds 
of observations: first, that the negative relationship between labour demand and the real 
wage is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition to justify the initial increase in 𝐿𝐼 
when 𝜔 falls. In effect, without any additional consideration, and under the plausible 
assumption that workers’ propensity to consume is higher than capitalists’ propensity, 
one should expect that the incentive to expand the production of commodity I will be 
sooner or later counterbalanced by a fall in 𝐷𝐼 that, ceteris paribus, is caused by the fall 
in the real wage.11 Hence, to ascertain that a rise in E will anyway exert a favourable 
effect on employment, it is further necessary to justify how the excess of production of 𝐼 
over internal consumption will be absorbed when the real wage decreases. For instance, 
within the marginal approach, the increased production caused by the fall in the real 
wage increases aggregate savings, which decreases the rate of interest and hence induc-
es higher levels of investment. But NS does not envisage this mechanism, at least ex-
plicitly.12 And while it recognizes the possible recessive effects of the fall in the real 
wage,13 the issue is virtually neglected because every excess of production over internal 
consumption is assumed to be passively absorbed by exports (𝑋𝐼). Hence, in short-run 
equilibrium:  
𝑋𝐼 = 𝑦𝐼 − 𝐷𝐼. [13] 
Therefore, this short-run adjustment presumes the absence of effective-demand prob-
lems.  
Behind the idea that the demand for exports is infinitely elastic at current prices we 
find NS authors arguing that the economy is sufficiently «small», i.e. an economy that 
takes the selling price of I as given. Note however that for this condition to hold it is 
only necessary that neither the domestic method of production nor domestic income 
distribution are relevant magnitudes to determine the international price of commodity 
I; and hence it does not need assume that the ratio of exports to global production of I is 
of any particular magnitude (as long as this proportion is smaller than 1).14  
                                                          
11 On this point, see Garegnani (1978, p. 343). 
12 For reasons of space, it is not possible to deal with this issue here, but labour capital substitution, ac-
cepted by NS, implies the existence of a negative relationship between investment and the rate of interest 
(See Dvoskin and Petri, 2017).  
13 Frenkel and Ros (2006, p. 635), Razmi (2007), Rapetti (2013, p. 6, fn. 9). 
14 To link the assumption of given prices with particular conditions of demand, it is further necessary 
to establish general price-quantity relations that allow univocally determining the way in which demand 
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The second consideration refers to the bases that justify the negative (and sufficiently 
elastic) relationship between employment and the level of the real wage itself. Here, NS 
closely follows the marginal approach and argues that the fall in 𝜔 increases employ-
ment because productive processes that employ more labour per unit of output become 
more profitable (the so-called «labour intensity channel», see Frenkel and Ros, 2006).  
The fact is, however, that this channel faces an insurmountable difficulty in the 
treatment of capital.15 A first difficulty within the specific context examined here is that 
the labour intensity channel is assumed to work in the «short run», namely with a given 
stock of capital goods; while on the contrary the neoclassical mechanisms of substitu-
tion are envisaged to work their effects only after sufficient time, since they incorporate 
the empirical fact that capital goods are specific to each technique, and hence plausibly 
presume that the «form» of the cooperating capital must change with the change in tech-
nique. If the available capital goods before and after devaluation are the same, it may 
well happen that the labour demand curve is highly inelastic, with the implication that a 
drastic – socially unbearable – fall in the real wage is needed to achieve a certain target 
level of employment. The problem is somehow hidden here because the production 
function assumed by NS presupposes that the same capital good is used in different pro-
portions when the quantity of labour employed changes. But it would become immedi-
ately evident once a more general specification of the available techniques is consid-
ered.16  
To see a second difficulty, let us focus first on the conditions of production of com-
modity I,17 and consider for the moment that only one method of production exists. 
Given that domestic costs of production must be equal to the selling price of I, from [2] 
and [4] we have: 










∗ 𝑘). [14] 




∗ (which so to speak «transforms» units of K in units of I) is 





∗ 𝑘 can be read as a magnitude that is physically homogenous with I. As a 
result, the kind of economy that one may infer from equation [14] is, in analytical terms, 
identical to a productive system in which I is produced by labour and itself. As it is the 
case in one-good models, it is clear then that, if one now considers the possibility of two 
or more productive processes for commodity I, it is possible to order these methods in 
terms of their relative content of labour per unit of commodity I (or capital) – given by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
influences technical conditions of production and/or distribution (see Garegnani, 1983). But these rela-
tions do not seem to exist outside the very restrictive world of «well-behaved», neoclassical factor de-
mand curves.  
15 See Petri (2004), for a thorough discussion of this problem within the marginal approach.  
16 For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Dvoskin and Fratini (2016). 
17 The following discussion is, however, valid for any method of production as long as inputs consist 







∗⁄  ratio –.
18 One may then conclude that the «labour intensity chan-
nel» works in the «right direction»: if we compare any two methods, a decrease in the 





ficient. However, this result critically depends on the particular conditions of production 
assumed by NS. If one considers, for instance, the possibility that sector I also requires 
domestically produced inputs – something which is accepted in some versions of NS 
(see Ros, 2016, p. 234) – one should consider the influence that changes in income dis-
tribution exert on the prices of the capital goods employed. And the labour intensity 
channel may not work in the direction predicted by NS (in the Appendix to this article 
we show this possibility). 
3.2. Medium and long-run mechanisms 
The medium-run mechanisms operate through changes in the relative profitability of 
sectors and hence affect the composition of investment, while the longer-run ones pre-
sume an increase in its level due to the rise in the general rate of profits. 
Let us consider first the medium-run mechanism. Devaluation rises commodity I’s 
demand price (𝑝𝐼
𝑑); and since C’s demand price (𝑝𝑐





𝑑 rises too. Therefore, the actual rate of profits of sector I (𝑟𝐼
𝐴) increases relative to 
that of sector C (𝑟𝐶
𝐴). This change in relative profitability across sectors triggers a virtu-
ous process of «structural change» (Rapetti, 2016, p. 259) by inducing the reallocation 
of resources to the relatively more productive and dynamic industry I. 








If we now turn our attention to the longer-run mechanism, NS postulates that capital 
accumulation, ?̂?, is an increasing function of the difference between the gross rate of 
profits, r, and the interest rate, i (determined by its international level, 𝑖∗).  
?̂? = 𝑓(𝑟 − 𝑖∗) [15] 
And given that the decrease in the real wage has caused, for a given 𝑖∗, an increase in 
(𝑟 − 𝑖∗), the rate of accumulation rises: 
↑ 𝐸/𝑤 →↓ 𝜔 →↑ 𝑟 →↑ ?̂? [E] 
This mechanism is known in the literature as the «development channel» (Frenkel and 
Ros, 2006, pp. 636-637).19 
                                                          
18 Actually, by the 𝑝𝐼
∗ 𝑙𝐼 𝑝𝑘ℎ
∗ 𝑘ℎ⁄  ratio, if one allows the kind of capital goods to differ among each pro-
ductive method ℎ. 
19 Rapetti’s «tradable-led growth» channel (Rapetti, 2016, p. 259) includes both the effects on the 
composition [D] and the level [E] of investment. 
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Mechanisms [D] and [E] are not exempt from difficulties either. Let us begin with 
[D]. A first problem is related to the alleged increment of 𝑞. Since it is assumed that 
sector C works under rising costs,20 the rise in 𝑦𝐶 due to the action of mechanisms [B] 
and [C] would eventually cause a rise in 𝑝𝐶, and hence, the final effect on 𝑞 is a priori 
indeterminate. To solve this issue, NS assumes that part of the production of C is con-
sumed by the Government in the amount 𝐺𝐶 and thus it assumes that, jointly with de-
valuation, contractionary fiscal policies are implemented to counteract the expansionary 
effects of [B]-[C] on 𝑦𝐶 that neutralize the effect on 𝑝𝐶. In other words, fiscal policy is 
used as a «nominal anchor» (Rapetti, 2013, p. 7) to achieve price stability. 
But let us abstract from this problem and examine how the composition of invest-




𝐴 rises too. As we shall proceed to 
argue, this needs considering the influence that the global rate of profits exerts on the 
domestic rate. In effect, under the assumption of free capital mobility adopted by NS, 
and at the level of abstraction that we are working with, we can safely assume that the 
domestic rate coincides –and it is determined by- the global rate, 𝑟∗. This implies that 
the following condition should be introduced:  
𝑟 = 𝑟∗21 [16] 
(note that this means that the E/w ratio, and therefore, the real wage, is the endogenous-
ly determined variable in condition [10]).  
We may now note that the effects of devaluation on the profitability of I resemble the 
effects caused by a technical improvement: at world prices, 𝑝𝐼
∗, domestic costs of pro-
duction in foreign currency decrease, and allow the sector to earn extra-profits. Let 𝑝𝐼0
𝑠  
stand for the domestic supply price of I before devaluation. At the initial level of 
𝐸 = 𝐸0, these costs allow sector I to earn the normal rate of profits, 𝑟
∗. If 𝐸1 is now the 
new and higher level of the exchange rate, the magnitude of the extra profits, 𝜌, is de-
termined by the difference between the selling price of I and its domestic costs of pro-







If we abstract for a moment from the problem under consideration, and examine the 
more general case of a technical improvement in a closed economy, the elimination of 𝜌 
                                                          
20 According to NS, good C is produced by labour and a fixed factor, also by means of a «Cobb Doug-
las» production function: 𝑦𝐶 = 𝑎𝐿
𝛽, with 𝛽 < 1. The function exhibits decreasing marginal returns and 
decreasing returns to scale.   
21 This arbitrage condition should be more properly seen as establishing a floor for the domestic rate of 
profit (that is, 𝑟 ≥ 𝑟∗). In effect, while if the condition 𝑟 < 𝑟∗ is verified, a persistent capital outflow 
would take place, the opposite condition (i.e. 𝑟 > 𝑟∗) could last for a long time, as the experience of many 
Latin American countries has shown in recent years (see, for instance, Serrano and Summa 2015 for the 
Brazilian case). In addition, condition [16] abstracts from devaluation expectations, spreads between 
domestic and foreign assets due to differential default risks and the relative degrees of international li-
quidity of national currencies. Once these factors are admitted, and if there is sufficient reason to believe 
that any of them can endogenously adjust to re-establish the equilibrium of net returns, then the condition 
𝑟 > 𝑟∗ could be verified without implying a persistent capital inflow. 
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would be the effect of the fall in the selling price of I down to its new and lower costs of 
production, once the more productive method is generalized through the action of com-
petition.22 If we now turn to the problem that concerns us, the fact is however that the 
alleged reallocation of resources from C to I is by itself unable to re-establish the equali-
ty between domestic and international returns, since this adjustment considered in isola-
tion does not alter 𝑝𝐼
∗(𝑟∗). As a result, the discrepancy between 𝑟 and 𝑟∗given by [17] 
persists.23 
All this suggests that condition [16] would be re-established once the generalization 
of the domestic method of production of I, in this case on a global scale, causes 𝑝𝐼
∗ to 
decrease until 𝜌 disappears.  
The local method would become the dominant one, either because domestic firms 
manage to displace foreign firms in the provision of I, and/or – in a context of free capi-
tal mobility – the latter locate their plants in the domestic economy (they transnational-
ize their production).  
While it is true that the supply of I in the share of output has increased, this has oc-
curred at the cost of assuming that, exclusively due to its policy of devaluation, the do-
mestic economy has managed to become the world producer of I, i.e. an export plat-
form. The limits of this result may be better appreciated if we note that: a) this implies 
abandoning the assumption that the country in question is a small price-taking country, 
which is at the basis of the analysis of NS; b) this highly positive effects may be very 
easily counteracted if other economies implement a similar policy, giving rise to a «cur-
rency war». And this seems highly plausible, if those countries attempt to avoid the fall 
in their own levels of output and employment, especially if this may be achieved with 
the aid of a policy that is at hand of almost every economy. 
The development channel (mechanism [E]) suffers from at least two shortcomings. 
Notice first that once the influence that the international rate of profits exerts on normal 
domestic profitability through condition [16] is considered, one seems forced to con-
clude that devaluation is unable to modify the real wage, at least with the sufficient per-
sistence to induce a process of capital accumulation as it is postulated by this channel. 
Second, equation [15] presents serious problems too, since is part of a family of in-
vestment functions that belong to the so called «profit-led» growth regimes.24 In this 
kind of models, the path of expansion of productive capacity and the trajectory of effec-
tive demand, which has final consumption as its main component, are in principle inde-
pendent from one another. As a result, over sufficient time the degree of utilization of 
productive capacity is endogenously determined, and may persistently diverge from its 
normal level. In this sense, it seems contradictory to accept that capitalists, having the 
                                                          
22 Essentially, firms that already operate in the market are forced to decrease 𝑝𝐼
𝑑  not to lose their market 
share. Moreover, it is not possible to exclude that, being now cheaper, the consumption of I increases at 
the expense of the consumption of other goods, and hence 𝑝𝐼  falls due to the action of increasing returns.    
23 At any rate, the affluence of resources towards sector I increases the differences between r and 𝑟∗. 
Given that I operates under increasing returns, costs decrease, and hence, given 𝑝𝐼
∗(𝑟∗), 𝜌 rises.  
24 See the seminal contribution by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). 
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possibility to revise their investment plans to adequate them to the trend of final de-
mand, anyway decide to keep an investment trend that implies underusing or overusing 
productive capacity indefinitely in the future. It is in other words not reasonable to as-
sume that firms incur in systematic errors in their projections of future demand, even 
when demand behaves in a completely predictable way. In this regard, one may con-
ceive two possible routes to re-establish the gravitation towards a normal degree of ca-
pacity utilization. On the one hand, it could be assumed that due to the existence of hys-
teresis or path dependence, normal utilization adjusts towards the actual rate of utiliza-
tion (see, for instance, Lavoie 1996). This first route does not seem to be very promis-
ing, because the normal degree of capacity utilization is determined by both technical 
and institutional factors; and since there is no reason to believe that any of these factors 
should change during the adjustment of capacity to demand, the alleged adjustment of 
the normal utilization towards the actual rate seems to be more an ad hoc response to 
the problem than a real solution to it.25 Alternatively, it is possible to conceive that the 
economy tends to operate under a normal degree of capacity utilization if the level of 
effective demand endogenously adjusts to the trend of capacity, by assuming that in-
vestment demand itself is able to absorb any increment of production that is related to 
the expansion of productive capacity. But this is unsatisfactory too, since it is none other 
than Say’s Law, or the absence of effective demand problems. 
In this respect, it seems much more adequate to admit that no necessary connection 
exists between the rate of profits and the rate of growth of the economy. Naturally, in 
the capitalist system there will always exist a minimum threshold for the rate of profits 
below which capitalists will not be willing to invest. But this does not imply that there is 
a mechanical relation between the average level of the rate of profits and capitalist in-
vestment decisions. Put it more simply, which are the incentives to expand productive 
capacity when real wages fall, if aggregate demand does not grow at the same rate as 
the expansion of capacity itself? The tendency towards the normal use of capacity utili-
zation supposes the gradual adjustment of capacity to demand, which implies that, at 
least partially, investment must be induced by income, in line with the «accelerator 
principle».26 
3.3. Wage dynamics 
Even if we accept both, that devaluation succeeds in rising 𝑟 and an investment function 
like [15], the subsequent behaviour of wages is central to evaluate the «development 
channel»: as NS accepts, due to the effect that devaluation indirectly exerts on the price 
of C, workers may attempt to recompose their initial real wage: 
↑ 𝑦𝐶 →↑ 𝑝𝐶 →↓ 𝐸/𝑤 →↓ 𝑟 [F] 
                                                          
25 See Cesaratto (2015) for a detailed criticism of the so-called Neo-Kaleckian position that takes the 
normal degree of utilization as an adjusting variable.  
26 For a recent critique of profit-led regimes along these lines, see Pariboni (2016). 
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Moreover, due to the expansionary effect of devaluation in both sectors, unemployment 
(U) decreases and workers’ bargaining power rises, which allows them to claim for 
higher nominal wages:  
↑ 𝑦𝐶⋀ ↑ 𝑦𝐶 →↓ 𝑈 →↓ 𝐸/𝑤 →↓ 𝑟 [G] 
Hence, over sufficient time, two counterbalancing forces operate on accumulation: on 
the one hand, the initial rise in the rate of profits promotes capital accumulation, which, 
given the increasing returns in sector I raises the average productivity of the economy 
and allows sustaining, for a given level of real wages, a higher rate of profits. On the 
other hand, the higher level of employment and the rising price of C cause nominal 
wages to grow, eroding normal profitability. The conclusion is that the final effect on 
accumulation is indeterminate.27 The difficulty is even accepted by NS authors. “[T]he 
real effect of devaluation”, Rapetti admits,  
…may be rapidly reversed due to a high pass-through on non-tradable prices or to real 
wage resistance by workers. Such outcomes are actually in line with the evidence from 
time series econometrics … A quick erosion of tradable profitability would undermine 
the incentives to investment and capital accumulation in the tradable sector would not 
prosper (Rapetti, 2013, p. 21). 
4. Latin American Productive Structures and Wage Resistance 
We have just seen that NS accepts that the increase in money wages indirectly induced 
by devaluation may annul the alleged benefits of this policy. However, New-Struc-
turalist scholars underestimate the more certain case of wage resistance directly trig-
gered by the rise in the 𝐸/𝑤 ratio, in this case through its positive effect on the price of 
the tradable commodity. This is really curious, especially if the analysis is focused on 
Latin American countries, in which: 
i) Sector T generally produces and exports necessary consumption goods, or inputs 
of these goods. 
ii) Sector I is a backward sector that cannot compete abroad at current international 
prices.28 
Interestingly enough, this pattern of specialization seems to have been recently ac-
cepted by some of the proponents of the New-Structuralist approach. 
The region [Latin America] has experienced a reduction in its capacity to produce trad-
able goods other than commodities because the persistent increase in foreign currency-
denominated unit labour costs impaired profitability of these activities. The share of 
complex tradable activities in GDP and employment generation dropped in favour of a 
rise in the importance of commodities, construction and non-tradable services. The re-
gion was de-industrialized, and to reverse this process will take time (Damill and Fren-
kel, 2017 p. 5). 
                                                          
27 Moreover, if there were not increasing returns in sector I, the recovery of nominal wages would 
eventually eliminate the initial increase in profitability (see Ros, 2016, p. 238). 
28 This does not mean that the sector does not exist (see fn. 29 below).  
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If we recall that condition [11] establishes the threshold between the two possible 
patterns of specialization, full specialization in sector C under free trade (𝑟 > 𝑟 ) will be 
more likely the lower is the labour requirement of the primary sector relative to the re-
quirement of labour in the industrial sector, and the higher is the import coefficient of 
sector I (the higher is 𝑘). And in fact, both features seem to apply to many Latin Ameri-
can countries, which produce primary commodities under extremely favourable condi-
tions (see, e.g. Bresser, 2008, pp. 53-55) and have a backward industrial sector, highly 
dependent on imported capital goods, inherited from the incomplete import-substitution 
experiences of past decades (these economies exhibit what Tavares, 2000, denominates 
«technical dependency»; see also Frenkel and Ros, 2006, p. 635). 
Therefore, sector I requires a real depreciation (a rise in the E/w ratio) to become in-
ternationally competitive. But then, nothing excludes that the attempt to boost the com-
petitiveness of the sector needs, due to ii), a drastic increase in the level of the real ex-
change rate, which turns out to be, owing to i), socially unviable.  
To visualize this, we must consider an open economy whose productive structure is 
such that the abovementioned features i) and ii) hold. This means that, given the rate of 
profits by [16], the real wage is maximized (the E/w ratio is minimized) when the nomi-
nal exchange rate derived from condition [10] is:  




∗  [10B] 





𝑑𝑤, 𝑟, 𝐸}. Now, notice that the assumed pattern of specialization im-
plies that the level of E that allows sector I to earn the normal rate of profits, 







(see condition [10]), is higher than 𝐸𝐶. In other words, since 𝑝𝐼
𝑠(𝐸𝐶) > 𝑝𝐼
𝑑(𝐸𝐶), commod-
ity I cannot be profitably produced without protection.29 
 This can be seen with the help of Figure 2:  
Figure 2: Sectorial exchange rates 
 
                                                          
29 If an import tariff on commodity I of magnitude 𝜏 = 𝑝𝐼
𝑠(𝐸𝐶) − 𝑝𝐼
𝑑(𝐸𝐶) is imposed, then this good 



















This means that, for sector I to earn the normal rate of profits (𝑟∗), a rate of devaluation 






− 1 would be needed. Notice that the ratio 
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𝐸𝐶
 is a sort of sec-












 .30 [18] 
And hence, for a given rate of profits, it positively depends on the degree of structural 
heterogeneity of the economy, namely: a) the relatively low labour productivity of sec-
tor I and b) the high import coefficients of this sector. As seen above, for Latin Ameri-
can peripheral economies, both factors suggest that 𝑆𝐶𝐼, and therefore the required rate 
of devaluation, could be drastic.  
It is now easy to see why this may not be socially feasible. Let us assume that there is 
a minimum quantity of C (𝛼) that is necessary for worker’s subsistence («food for the 
cattle»). Given 𝑤 = ?̅?, it is possible to determine the maximum level of the exchange 




∗  [19] 
The implication is the following: since 𝐸𝐼 = 𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝑆𝐶𝐼, if structural heterogeneity, meas-
ured by SCI, is severe, it may well happen that 𝐸𝐼 > 𝐸α. Therefore, the required rate of 
devaluation will be socially unviable, it will provoke full wage resistance, and will neu-
tralize the initial effects of the rise of the exchange rate on international competitive-
ness.  
5. Exchange Rate Policy, Sectorial Competitiveness and Income Distribution 
In the previous section we have seen that the recourse to exchange-rate policy to pro-
mote the development of a particular sector may clash with the distributive limit. Leav-
ing this problem aside, the temptation may be strong to use this tool to boost one partic-
ular sector in the belief that this will not be damaging for any other industry. As, for 
instance, Ros and Frenkel (2006, p. 635) argue: “A more depreciated real exchange rate 
encourages tradable activities that were not profitable before” (emphasis added). We 
shall see next how unfounded this presumption could be. 
                                                          
30 Clearly, had the exchange rate raised up to EI, the rate of profits would rise pari passu according to 
[10], and sector C would still be the most profitable industry. This shows that SCI is not an accurate index 
to determine the magnitude of devaluation needed to promote a particular sector. We will return to this 
point in the following section. At any rate, if we assume that C is produced under conditions of differen-
tial rent, which is a particularly plausible assumption in the case of Latin American economies (see e.g. 
Bresser, 2008, who argues that C yields «Ricardian Rents»), devaluation increases the magnitude of the 
rent but it does not affect the average rate of profits. For a formalization of differential rent in the context 
of the theory of international trade, see Birolo (1981) and Dvoskin and Feldman (2017a) for the specific 
context of Latin American countries. 
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The analysis will be conducted under the assumption that many (and not just two) 
commodities are produced in the economy, and we will examine the effect of changes in 
the 𝐸/𝑤 ratio on some particular industries. We shall continue to assume that a generic 
industrial good h is produced by labour and an imported capital good. To simplify the 
notation, prices are expressed in terms of labour commanded (𝑤 = 1). Let us start by 




∗ . [20] 
𝐶𝐶ℎ (for «comparative costs») is an index of competitiveness that measures the relation-
ship between domestic and international costs of production in sector h. The higher the 
level of 𝐶𝐶ℎ, the stronger the relative backwardness of industry h is supposed to be. In 
particular, when 𝐶𝐶ℎ > 1 (≤ 1), the sector cannot (can) compete at the prevailing inter-
national prices. If we now consider two industrial sectors 𝑖 and 𝑗 such that 𝐶𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝐶𝑗 , it 
follows from [20] that sector i has a lower degree of relative backwardness than sector j. 
This index is nothing but the usual definition of comparative advantages, given that 








Let us now consider the situation in which condition 𝐶𝐶ℎ > 1 (ℎ = 𝑖, 𝑗) holds. If, 
additionally, 𝐶𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝐶𝑗 , devaluation should allow sector i to produce and export before 
sector j. This situation is represented in Figure 3, in which we illustrate the relative costs 
of production of two generic commodities i and j as decreasing functions of 𝐸.  
Figure 3: Comparative costs (𝑟 = 𝑟1)31 
 
Given the underlying conditions of production of the generic sector h, an alternative 
representation of [20] is: 
                                                          
31 An example of technical coefficients, rate of profits and international prices that reproduce this posi-
tion of the comparative costs curves is the following: 
𝑟 = 50%, (𝑙𝑖 ; 𝑝𝑘
∗𝑘𝑖) = (1; 1 4⁄ ) , (𝑙𝑗; 𝑝𝑘
∗𝑘𝑗) = (5 3⁄ ; 1 3⁄ ) y (𝑝𝑖
∗; 𝑝𝑗















∗ . [22] 
If we choose units of measurement such that 𝑝ℎ
∗ = 1 (ℎ = 𝑖, 𝑗), the straight line 𝐶𝐶ℎ =
1 defines a «threshold of sectorial competitiveness». Notice that, for 𝑟 = 𝑟1, the initial 
level of the exchange rate, 𝐸 = 𝐸0, is too low for both sectors 𝑖 and 𝑗 to be international-
ly competitive. Furthermore, since 𝐶𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝐶𝑗, sector i is supposed to be able to export 
its production before sector j. In effect, if 𝐸 𝜖 (𝐸𝑖(𝑟1); 𝐸𝑗(𝑟1)), it follows that 𝐶𝐶𝑖 < 1 <
𝐶𝐶𝑗 (only 𝑖 is competitive). While if 𝐸 > 𝐸𝑗 the competitiveness of both sectors is en-
sured. At first glance, everything seems to support the robustness of 𝐶𝐶 as an index of 
relative sectorial efficiency. 
The case represented in Figure 3 is, however, highly restrictive, since it illustrates a 
situation in which 𝐶𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝐶𝑗  for every value of 𝐸 (notice that the 𝐶𝐶 curves do not in-
tersect). It is easy to verify that, if we choose the units of account so that the interna-
tional prices are equal to one, the condition:  
(𝑙𝑖 − 𝑙𝑗)(𝑘𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗) ≥ 0
32 [23] 
is necessary and sufficient to avoid an economically relevant intersection33 of the curves 
of comparative costs. However, it is not difficult to conceive a situation in which [23] 
does not hold and the curves CC intersect, for instance, above the threshold of competi-
tiveness. This is illustrated in Figure 4: 
Figure 4: Comparative costs (𝑟 = 𝑟1)
34 
 
                                                          
32 To derive this condition, consider the equality between 𝐶𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑗. The level of 𝐸 that allows both 
industries to be simultaneously competitive abroad is given by 𝐸 = −
𝑙𝑖−𝑙𝑗
𝑘𝑖−𝑘𝑗
. Therefore, (𝑙𝑖 − 𝑙𝑗) must be 
of the same sign as (𝑘𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗) for this level of E to be negative and hence economically irrelevant. Notice 
too that the profit rate does not play any role in this condition. 




∗) and a lower slope (𝑙𝑖/𝑝𝑖
∗). 
34 An example of technical coefficients, rate of profits and international prices that reproduce this posi-
tion of the comparative costs curves is the following: 
𝑟 = 50%, (𝑙𝑖 ; 𝑝𝑘
∗𝑘𝑖) = (1; 1 2⁄ ), (𝑙𝑗; 𝑝𝑘
∗𝑘𝑗) = (5 3⁄ ; 1 3⁄ ) y (𝑝𝑖
∗; 𝑝𝑗





𝐸 𝐸𝑖 𝑟1𝐸𝑗 𝑟1
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At 𝐸 = 𝐸0, condition 𝐶𝐶ℎ > 1 is again verified for ℎ = 𝑖, 𝑗, so neither sector 𝑖 nor sec-
tor 𝑗 can compete in the international markets. Moreover, since 𝐶𝐶𝑖 < 𝐶𝐶𝑗, one may 
once again expect that devaluation allows sector 𝑖 to export its production before sector 
𝑗. Nevertheless, the opposite occurs. Specifically, if 𝐸 𝜖 (𝐸𝑗(𝑟1); 𝐸𝑖(𝑟1)), we would ob-
serve that 𝐶𝐶𝑗 < 1 < 𝐶𝐶𝑖: sector 𝑗 is competitive while sector 𝑖 is not.  
Criterion 𝐶𝐶 is not sufficiently general to predict which sector crosses the threshold 
of competitiveness first, even if (we provisionally assume that) the nominal wage and 
the rate of profits remain constant when the exchange rate varies. The reason is that the 
straight lines intersect above the threshold of competitiveness. One may think, anyway, 
that the result is exclusively due to the 𝐶𝐶 criterion to be adopted. In this regard, one 
could employ instead the index 𝑆𝐶𝐼 of the previous section (equation [18]), which can 
be alternatively defined as the ratio between the minimum level of 𝐸 that allows sector 
h to get access to the world market, 𝐸𝑖, and any arbitrary observed level, 𝐸0.
35 Let us 





Clearly, when 𝑆𝐶𝐼ℎ > 1 (< 1) the sector is not (is) competitive. According to this cri-
terion, 𝑖 is «relatively more productive» than 𝑗 if 𝐸𝑖 < 𝐸𝑗 (or equivalently, if
 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑖 < 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑗).  
It is easy to show that 𝑆𝐶𝐼 correctly predicts which sector becomes competitive first 
in the situations represented by Figures 3 and 4. Let us also note that although the abso-
lute magnitude of the individual 𝑆𝐶𝐼ℎ depends on the effective value of 𝐸 used in [18’], 
namely 𝐸0, the relative position of sectors according to this index is independent of this 
magnitude, since changes in E affect all sectors in the same proportion. In this regard, 
SCI is more robust than CC, since, as we have seen, the relative position of the CC 
curves does change with E. However, the SCI index is not free of difficulties either.  
In fact, the careful reader may have already noticed that the value of each 𝑆𝐶𝐼ℎ de-
pends on the position of the curves of comparative costs, relative to the threshold of 
competitiveness. And the fact is that such position depends on the level of the rate of 
profits.36 In effect:  















                                                          
35 For this interpretation of SCI, see for instance, Bresser (2008, p.55). 
36 An analogous result is also present in the case of 𝐶𝐶. Although the relative position of two 𝐶𝐶 













variations in the rate of profits affect the absolute position of the curves. Hence, although the ordering 
according to 𝐶𝐶 is invariant to changes in the rate of profits, which sector becomes competitive first can 
be modified by changes in 𝑟. A graphical representation of this phenomenon can also be seen by compar-
ing Figures 4 and 5. 
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Condition [24] shows that the relative competitiveness of sectors could be affected 
by changes in distribution. This issue can be appreciated in Figure 5, in which we repre-
sent the curves of comparative costs for the same technical coefficients employed in 
Figure 4, but for a lower rate of profits, 𝑟2 (<𝑟1). 
Figure 5: Comparative costs (𝑟 = 𝑟2 < 𝑟1)
37 
 
𝑆𝐶𝐼 (and 𝐶𝐶) predicts that sector 𝑖 is the first to cross over the threshold of competi-
tiveness. If one would attempt to improve, for instance, the competitiveness of sector 𝑖, 
the necessary rate of devaluation would be given, in principle, by the magnitude 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑖. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion omits that, in general, 𝐸 and r will move in the same di-
rection (see condition [10]) and hence, the rise in 𝐸 may lead to a situation as the one 
already described in Figure 4.  
Two observations follow from this. For the first one it would be useful to represent 
the curve of comparative costs for sector 𝑖 before and after the rise in 𝑟 caused by de-
valuation. This is shown in Figure 6.  
It can be seen from the figure that 𝑆𝐶𝐼 underestimates the magnitude of the required 
devaluation to ensure the competitiveness of sector 𝑖. This is because SCI does not in-
corporate the subsequent rise in 𝑟 when 𝐸 rises, and hence it neglects that production 
costs will rise, not only because 𝐸 has risen, but also because r has risen too. This 
means that devaluation itself causes the initial target level of E to rise: in this case from 
𝐸𝑖(𝑟2) to 𝐸𝑖(𝑟1). And this rise may be drastic, and therefore socially unviable for the rea-
sons discussed in section IV. 
                                                          
37 An example of technical coefficients, rate of profits and international prices that reproduce this posi-
tion of the comparative costs curves is the following: 
𝑟 = 10%, (𝑙𝑖; 𝑝𝑘
∗𝑘𝑖) = (1; 1 2⁄ ), (𝑙𝑗; 𝑝𝑘
∗𝑘𝑗) = (5 3⁄ ; 1 3⁄ ) y (𝑝𝑖
∗; 𝑝𝑗





𝐸 𝐸𝑖 𝑟2 𝐸𝑗 𝑟2
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Figure 6: Comparative costs (𝑟 = 𝑟1 and 𝑟 = 𝑟2) 
 
For the last observation it would be convenient to jointly represent in Figure 7, the 
curves of comparative costs before and after the change in the rate of profits (note that 
the rise in 𝑟 from 𝑟2 to 𝑟1 moves both CC curves upwards, but it does not affect their 
relative position). 
Figure 7: Comparative costs (𝑟 = 𝑟1 and 𝑟 = 𝑟2) 
 
The second remark is therefore the following: a rise in 𝐸 to promote sector 𝑗, ends 
up, due to the change in income distribution, by excluding sector 𝑖, which was already 
competitive (actually it excludes both sectors). To see this, notice that, when 𝑟 = 𝑟2, if 
𝐸 ∈ (𝐸𝑖(𝑟2); 𝐸𝑗(𝑟2)) sector 𝑖 is competitive while sector 𝑗 is not. If 𝐸 is raised to the de-
sired target, 𝐸𝑗(𝑟2), it may happen that with the subsequent rise in 𝑟 to 𝑟1, the new effec-
tive rate 𝐸=𝐸𝑗(𝑟2) is lower than the new target for sector 𝑖, 𝐸𝑖(𝑟1). This means that sector 
















𝐸𝑖(𝑟2) < 𝐸𝑗(𝑟2) < 𝐸𝑗(𝑟1) < 𝐸𝑖(𝑟1) [25] 
and since the final level of 𝐸 is lower than both new targets 𝐸𝑗(𝑟1) and 𝐸𝑖(𝑟1), actually 
none of the sectors is competitive (while at the initial effective level, since 𝐸 ∈
(𝐸𝑖(𝑟2); 𝐸𝑗(𝑟2)), sector 𝑖 was). Notice finally from [25] that the rise in 𝑟 from 𝑟2 to 𝑟1 has 
caused an inversion of the sectorial order according to the 𝑆𝐶𝐼 index, since 𝐸𝑖(𝑟2) <
𝐸𝑗(𝑟2) while now 𝐸𝑗(𝑟1) < 𝐸𝑖(𝑟1). 
The general conclusion is the following: the fact that sectorial order depends, in gen-
eral, on the rate of profits, seems to show that a purely technical index of productivity 
does not exist. For the same reason, one should be extremely careful to use this kind of 
criteria to derive policy recommendations, since they require predicting with high preci-
sion the possible reactions of the rate of profits and of the real wage to changes in the 
exchange rate. When these reactions are not duly considered, the attempt to develop one 
sector may for instance have the undesired effect of being detrimental to another one.  
6. Conclusions 
Throughout this paper we have critically explored the transmission channels from the 
real exchange rate to economic growth discussed by New-Structuralist literature. As we 
have seen, the approach postulates restrictive mechanisms that make it impossible to 
establish a general relationship between both variables. 
In addition, we have shown that NS does not pay to the issue of the distributive con-
flict the attention it deserves. The reason why its proponents cannot see the problem 
should be clear at this point: by assuming that the industrial sector is already interna-
tionally competitive, there is no need for a drastic devaluation in order to accelerate 
growth. If we add the fact that the transmission channels within this position assume a 
sufficient wage elasticity of the labour demand curve, the need for a sharp rise of the 
real exchange rate in order to activate the virtuous process disappears. 
We have seen that the distributive barrier is, however, a serious problem for many 
developing countries, Latin American economies for instance, whose productive struc-
ture is featured by an advanced sector that exports primary commodities (or inputs of 
these goods), while the industrial sector, potentially more dynamic, cannot compete at 
given world prices, and hence may need a drastic devaluation to afford the normal, in-
ternationally given, rate of profits, which may not be socially implementable. 
We finish with the following consideration. Undoubtedly, from the New-Structuralist 
view one can derive very concrete policy prescriptions (devaluation and fiscal consoli-
dation, among others). For these to be plausible measures, however, the relationship 
between the exchange rate and economic growth should not be, borrowing an expres-
sion from Marx, «purely accidental», but their causality should be firmly established. 
Therefore, our critical assessment of NS leads us to warn about the potential risks of 
such policy prescriptions: to the possible inflationary, regressive and recessive effects of 
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devaluation, clearly documented within the Latin American Structuralist literature from 
the 1950s onwards, in this paper we have noted that the rise of the exchange rate may 
even generate an effect opposed to the one pursued, and worsen the competitiveness of 
already-competitive productive sectors. 
Appendix: On the Labour Intensity Channel 
This appendix discusses the labour intensity channel (LIC), according to which a rise of 
the 𝐸/𝑤 ratio (a rise of 𝑟) should induce the adoption of productive methods that em-
ploy a larger quantity of labour per unit of output. We shall see that when the restrictive 
hypothesis adopted by NS regarding the conditions of production of the industrial good 
are relaxed, such mechanism is not generally valid. In particular, we will assume that 
the production of commodity I requires not only labour and an imported input, but also 
a capital good, M, which is domestically produced. The assumed technical conditions 
of production are summarized in the following equations of supply prices:38 
{
𝐸𝑝𝐼
∗ = 𝑝𝐼  =  (1 + 𝑟)(𝑙𝐼𝑤 + 𝑚𝐼𝑝𝑚 + 𝑘𝐼𝑝𝑘
∗𝐸)
𝑝𝑚 = (1 + 𝑟)(𝑙𝑚𝑤 + 𝑘𝑚𝑝𝑘
∗𝐸)
 [A1] 
It is possible to identify at least three criteria to determine which method employs a 
«larger quantity of labour»: 





Criterion 2: Technique 𝛼 employs more total labour (direct and indirect) than another 








Criterion 3: Technique α employs more labour than β if the net product under α is low-
er than under β. This means that α can afford a lower real wage than β when the rate of 























We additionally know that 𝛼 is more convenient than 𝛽 if, at the ruling prices, it is 







 (𝑗 = 𝛼, 𝛽) denotes the supply price of I under method 𝑗 = 𝛼, 𝛽. To see that the 
LIC can behave in a «perverse» way, let us consider a situation such that, at current 
                                                          
38 The technical conditions of production of C are not represented here because they are of no rele-
vance for the analysis. 
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prices, costs of production under both methods coincide, and are also equal to the inter-
national price of I, 𝑝𝐼
∗. Under these circumstances, both methods coexist. We know that 










𝑑 is again re-established. This is a problem of choice of tech-

















= (1 + 𝑟𝑗)(𝑙𝑚𝜔 + 𝑘𝑚𝑝𝑘




∗                                                        
 [A6] 
where 𝜋𝑗 = 𝑝𝐼
𝑗
𝐸⁄  stands for the cost of production of I under method 𝑗 = 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜔 =
𝑤 𝐸⁄ , 𝑟𝑗 is the rate of profits under method 𝑗 and 𝜋𝑚
(𝑗)
 is the respective cost of produc-
tion of 𝑀 in foreign currency. For convenience, we set 𝑝𝐼
∗ = 1.  
We know that the technique with lower production costs will be the one that can afford 
the highest level of 𝑟𝑗, given 𝜔.  
Let us assume that method 𝛽 is less labour intensive than 𝛼 under the three criteria de-
fined above. Figure A1 illustrates a situation in which LIC behaves perversely. 
Figure A1: 𝑟 − 𝜔 relation 
 
In particular, if ω = ω̅ and 𝑟𝛼 = 𝑟𝛽, both methods can coexist. It is then clear that a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a fall in 𝜔 to induce the adoption of the less la-
bour intensive technique 𝛽 is that 𝑟𝛼 is less steep than 𝑟𝛽. Given that both curves are 


















We now proceed to illustrate this possibility by means of a concrete numerical ex-
ample. The first two rows of Table A1 show, respectively, the coefficients of production 
of I under methods α and β, while the third row shows the technical coefficients of 




 Labour 𝑀 𝐾 










𝑀 1 32⁄  0 1 
 
It is easy to see that method α is more labour intensive than β under the three crite-





∗ = 1 [A8] 
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(≅ 0.070), and hence Criterion 2 is satisfied too. Finally, Criterion 































Birolo, A. (1981), Mezzi di Produzione non prodotti e distribuzione del reddito in una 
economia aperta, Studi Economici, 16, 115-135. 
Bresser Pereira, L.C. (2008), The Dutch desease and its neturalization: a Ricardian ap-
proach, Brasilian Journal of Political Economy, 28(1), 47-71. 
Cesaratto, S. (2015), Neo-Kaleckian and Sraffian controversies on the theory of accu-
mulation, Review of Political Economy, 27(2), 154-182. 
Damill, M. and Frenkel, R. (2017), Symposium: Dilemmas of exchange rate and mone-
tary policies in Latin America, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 40(1), 1-8. 
Dvoskin, A. and Feldman, G. (2017a), Income Distribution and the Balance of Pay-
ments. A Formal Reconstruction of Some Argentinian Structuralist Contributions. 
Part I: Technical Dependency, Review of Keynesian Economics (forthcoming). 
Dvoskin, A. and Feldman, G. (2017b), Income Distribution and the Balance of Pay-
ments. A Formal Reconstruction of Some Argentinian Structuralist Contributions. 
Part II: Financial Dependency, Review of Keynesian Economics (forthcoming). 
Dvoskin, A. and Fratini, S. (2016), On Samuelson-Etula Master function and the capital 
controversy, European journal of the history of economic thought, 23(6), 1032-1058. 
Dvoskin, A. and Petri, F. (2017), Again on the relevance of reverse capital deepening 
and reswitching, Metroeconomica, 68(4), 625-659. 
Frenkel, R. and Ros, J. (2006), Unemployment and the Real Exchange Rate in Latin 
America, World Development, 34(4), 631-646. 
Garegnani, P. (1978), Notes on consumption, investment and effective demand: I, Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics, 2(4), 335-353. 
Garegnani, P. (1983), The Classical Theory of Wages and the Role of Demand Sched-
ules in the Determination of Relative Prices, American Economic Review, 73(2), 
309-313. 
Kurz, H. and Salvadori, N. (1995), Theory of Production, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Lavoie, M. (1996), Traverse, Hysteresis, and Normal Rates of Capacity Utilization in 
Kaleckian Models of Growth and Distribution, Review of Radical Political Econom-
ics, 28(4), 113-147. 
Lewis, A.W. (1954), Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, The 
Manchester School, 22(2), 139-191. 
Neto, A.S.M. and Lima, G.T. (2017), Competitive Exchange Rate and Public Infrastruc-
ture in a Macrodynamic of Economic Growth, Metroeconomica, 68(4), 792-815. 
Oreiro, J.L., Missio, F., and Jayme Jr., F.G. (2015), Capital Accumulation, Structural 
Change and Real Exchange Rate in a Keynesian-Structuralist Growth Model, Panoe-
conomicus, 62(2), 237-256. 
26 
 
Pariboni, R. (2016), Autonomous demand and the Marglin-Bhaduri model: a critical 
note, Review of Keynesian Economics, 4(4), 409-428. 
Petri, F. (2004), General Equilibrium, Capital and Macroeconomics, London: Macmil-
lan. 
Rapetti, M. (2013), Macroeconomic Policy Coordination in a Competitive Real Ex-
change Rate Strategy for Development, Journal of Globalization and Development, 
3(2), 1-31. 
Rapetti, M. (2016), The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth: Some Observa-
tions on the Possible Channels, in M. Damill, M. Rapetti, and G. Rozenwurcel (eds), 
Macroeconomics and Development: Roberto Frenkel and the Economics of Latin 
America, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 250-268. 
Razmi, A. (2007), The Contractionary Short-Run Effects of Nominal Devaluation in 
Developing Countries: some Neglected Nuances, International Review of Applied 
Economics, 21(5), 577-602. 
Razmi, A., Rapetti, M., and Skott, P. (2012), The Real Exchange Rate and Economic 
Development, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 23(2), 151-169. 
Rodrik, D. (2008), The real exchange rate and economic growth, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 39(2), 365-439. 
Ros, J. (2016), The Real Exchange Rate, the Real Wage, and Growth: A Formal Analy-
sis of the “Development Channel”, in M. Damill, M. Rapetti, and G. Rozenwurcel 
(eds), Macroeconomics and Development: Roberto Frenkel and the Economics of 
Latin America, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 229-249.  
Ros, J. and Skott, P. (1998), Dynamic effects of trade liberalization and currency over-
valuation under conditions of increasing returns, The Manchester School, 66(4), 
466-489. 
Serrano, F. and Summa, R. (2015), Distribution and Cost-Push inflation in Brazil under 
inflation targeting, 1999-2014, Centro Sraffa Working Papers n. 14. 
Sraffa, P. (1926), The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions, The Economic 
Journal, 36(144), 535-550. 
Steedman, I. (1999), Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities and the 
Open Economy, Metroeconomica, 50(3), 260-276. 
Tavares, M.D.C. (2000), Subdesenvolvimento, Dominação e Luta de Classes, in Tava-







Authors contact information:  
Ariel Dvoskin 
CONICET/National University of San Martín 
Buenos Aires (Argentina)  
advoskin@unsam.edu.ar 
 
Germán David Feldman 
National University of San Martín 




CONICET/National University of San Martín 
Buenos Aires (Argentina)  
gianni@unsa.edu.ar  
 
